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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities 
 
Abstract:  This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings 
and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports.  While several prior 
studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence 
of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question.  
Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research 
design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias 
within a broader sample.  In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive 
association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on 
the observable characteristics of their contracting environments.  Instead, we find some evidence 
that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher 
levels of equity incentives.   
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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives 
and accounting irregularities (e.g., restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and shareholder class action lawsuits).  
Although equity holdings may alleviate certain agency problems between executives and 
shareholders, concerns have arisen among researchers, regulators, and the business press that 
“high-powered” equity incentives might also motivate executives to manipulate accounting 
information for personal gain.  This view assumes that stock price is a function of reported 
earnings and that executives manipulate accounting earnings to increase the value of their 
personal equity holdings.1  If this allegation is true and the economic cost of accounting 
manipulation is large, this idea has important implications for executive-compensation contract 
design and corporate monitoring by both internal and external parties.   
Although at least ten recent studies have examined the relationship between equity incentives 
and various types of accounting irregularities, no conclusive set of results has emerged from this 
literature.  Eight prior studies find evidence of a positive relationship, but even within this group 
the evidence is mixed with regard to which components of an executive’s equity incentives (e.g., 
restricted stock, unvested options, and vested options) produce this association.  Two additional 
studies do not find evidence of a relationship, even though they share similar proxies and 
samples with studies that do find a relationship. 
                                                 
1 This view implicitly ignores (or considers as trivial) the effect of executive ethics, actions by monitors, and 
executives’ expected costs associated with manipulation.  This view also requires that the market is unable to 
distinguish between “true” and manipulated earnings. 
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Most prior studies adopt a research design that relies heavily on assumptions about the 
functional form of the relationship between accounting irregularities and equity incentives (as 
well as whatever control variables are used in the study).  Specifically, these studies match firms 
on the outcome variable of interest (e.g., a firm that experienced accounting fraud is matched 
with a firm that did not experience fraud during the same period) using a small number of 
variables such as firm size and industrial classification.  Other potential confounding variables 
are “controlled” through their inclusion in an estimation equation that relates accounting 
irregularities to equity incentives.  Although common in empirical research, this research design 
relies on a variety of restrictive and perhaps unrealistic assumptions to produce reliable 
inferences.   
Prior studies have also tended to analyze a relatively small sample of firms that lie in the 
intersection of the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database and either Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Financial Statement Restatements or U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).  Since 
ExecuComp does not provide data for the majority of firms in the economy, it is possible that the 
results of prior studies are influenced by selection bias.2  Moreover, it is not clear whether small 
samples (e.g., between 50 and 200 observations) provide sufficient statistical power for an 
analysis of the determinants of a relatively rare event such as a major accounting manipulation.  
This uncertainty hinders the ability to draw inferences regarding the primary research hypothesis 
when a statistically significant relationship is not detected.  Finally, prior studies have generally 
ignored the likely endogenous matching of executives with their observed compensation 
contracts and, thus, their observed level of equity incentives.  Since this type of endogenous 
                                                 
2 Studies using ExecuComp data may be prone to selection bias concerns, since ExecuComp focuses exclusively on 
firms listed in the Fortune 1500 (e.g., Cadman et al., 2006). 
5 
 
matching is an important feature of the executive labor market, it is difficult to interpret prior 
results, because the reported parameter estimates are likely to be biased. 
We draw inferences regarding the relationship between CEO equity incentives and 
accounting irregularities from a broad data set and use a research design that better addresses the 
potential confounds inherent in observational studies (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 
2002).  To reduce the potential for “overt bias,” we employ a propensity-score matched-pair 
research design to join observations that are similar along a comprehensive set of firm- and 
manager-level dimensions.3  The propensity-score method forms matched pairs of CEO firm-
years that have similar contracting environments but differing levels of CEO equity incentives.  
This approach alleviates misspecification that occurs when the research design assumes an 
incorrect functional form for the relationship between the variables of interest (including 
controls) and the outcome.   
We also assess the sensitivity of our results to “hidden bias,” or unobserved correlated 
omitted variables, using the bounding techniques developed by Rosenbaum (2002).  This 
bounding approach provides insight into the likelihood that our results are confounded by 
explanations such as endogenous matching of CEOs and equity incentives on the basis of 
unobserved variables such as the level of CEO risk aversion.  Thus, our research design relaxes 
the assumptions of the traditional matched-pairs approach and assesses the impact of omitted-
variable and endogeneity concerns.        
In contrast to most prior studies, we do not observe a positive relationship between CEO 
equity incentives and the incidence of accounting irregularities.  Instead, our evidence suggests 
                                                 
3  Rosenbaum (2002) defines overt bias as “one that can be seen in the data at hand,” which means that it is bias that 
is related to observable variables.  It can result from either omission of observable variables or from the specification 
of an improper functional form for the relationship between observable variables and the outcome variable of 
interest.  In contrast, “hidden bias” is associated with the omission of unobservable variables (i.e., correlated omitted 
variables).  We consider both types of bias in our analysis. 
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that the level of CEO equity incentives has a modest negative relationship with the incidence of 
accounting irregularities.  This result is more consistent with the notion that equity incentives 
reduce agency costs that arise with respect to financial reporting, than is the interpretation that 
equity incentives cause managers to manipulate reported earnings.   
Although we provide only one substantive application, propensity-score methods can (and 
perhaps should) be applied to other empirical accounting studies in which the hypothesized 
causal variable is an endogenous choice by managers, boards of directors, or other similar 
parties.  In particular, using propensity scores to generate matched pairs with maximum variation 
in the causal variable of interest while minimizing the variation in the controls is, in many cases, 
a superior econometric approach to matching on the outcome variable and relying on a linear or 
some other assumed functional form to control for confounding variables.  Moreover, 
propensity-score methods also enable the researcher to explicitly quantify the sensitivity of the 
results for the primary causal variable to unobserved correlated omitted variables.   
 Section 2 of this paper reviews the prior literature examining the relationship between 
executive incentives and accounting irregularities.  Section 3 describes the sample and our 
primary measurements.  Section 4 discusses the propensity-score matched-pair research design 
and compares this approach with the regression research design that is common in prior studies.  
Section 5 presents our primary empirical results.  Section 6 discusses sensitivity analyses.  
Section 7 provides concluding remarks.  Finally, Appendix A includes basic methodological 
background regarding observational studies and Appendix B discusses the importance of 
functional form when selecting regression or matching approaches for inference. 
 
2.  Prior Research  
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     At least ten recent studies (summarized in Table 1) examine the relationship between 
accounting irregularities and executives’ equity incentives.  These studies generally hypothesize 
that equity-based compensation and holdings provide incentives for managers to manipulate 
accounting numbers (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007; 
Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006), perhaps to increase gains from pending insider sales (Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005).  Harris and Bromiley (2007), for example, suggest that the likelihood of 
managerial impropriety rises with “the strength of inducements” and therefore test for a positive 
relationship between the probability of accounting misrepresentation and stock-option 
compensation.   Few studies (e.g., O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, and Gilley, 2006; Burns and 
Kedia, 2006), however, explicitly consider the alternative possibility that equity incentives might 
instead lessen management’s desire to manipulate accounting numbers by aligning managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders.  
Eight of the ten papers listed in Table 1 find some evidence that executives’ equity incentives 
exhibit a positive statistical association with accounting manipulation.  Although the results of 
these studies might be considered as a consensus for this research question, there is considerable 
variation across inferences presented within these papers.  This lack of consistency occurs even 
though similar proxies for accounting manipulation and equity incentives are used and there is 
considerable cross-sectional and temporal overlap in their samples.  For example, Johnson, Ryan, 
and Tian (2009) and Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) both assess the relationship between 
the incidence of accounting fraud (identified using AAERs) and the equity portfolio delta 
computed for top firm executives.4  Although the two samples exhibit considerable overlap, 
Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) report evidence of a strong positive association between 
                                                 
4  Equity portfolio delta is the change in the (typically risk-neutral) dollar value of an executive’s equity portfolio 
(stock, restricted stock, and stock-option holdings) for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock.    
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unrestricted equity holdings and the incidence of accounting fraud, while Erickson, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2006) do not observe any statistical association.  Similarly, Baber, Kang, and Liang 
(2007) and Harris and Bromiley (2006) both examine the relationship between equity incentives 
and the incidence of accounting restatements.  Their samples differ in the number of 
observations but overlap completely in observation years.  In spite of this overlap, the studies 
report surprisingly different results.  Harris and Bromiley (2006) find a positive association 
between the incidence of accounting restatements and the ratio of option compensation to total 
compensation, while Baber, Kang, and Liang (2007) do not find a similar statistical association.   
Some prior studies provide evidence of a positive association only for certain components of 
option-related holdings (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, 
Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007).  Others provide evidence of a positive association for different 
equity components, such as unvested options and stock ownership (Cheng and Warfield, 2005), 
vested stock holdings (Johnson, Ryan, and Tian, 2009), and the entire equity portfolio 
(Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006).  Yet another study finds evidence of a positive association for 
option-related equity components only when conditioned on the Board of Directors’ composition 
and compensation structure (O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, and Gilley, 2006).  These 
inconsistencies highlight the difficulty in drawing general inferences regarding the association 
between equity incentives and accounting irregularities from prior research. 
 
3. Sample and Measurement Choice 
9 
 
Our sample of CEO equity incentives, measured between 2001 and 2005, is obtained from a 
comprehensive database provided by Equilar, Inc.5  This database is similar to ExecuComp’s in 
that it provides executive-compensation and equity-holdings data collected from annual proxy 
filings (DEF 14A) with the SEC.  However, the Equilar data provides 3,634, 3,930, 4,043, 4,051, 
and 4,047 CEO-firm observations (in contrast with the roughly 1,500 CEO-firm observations 
available annually from ExecuComp) across fiscal years 2001 to 2005, respectively.6     
     It is difficult to construct an appropriate empirical measure for the incidence of accounting 
manipulation, since this managerial action is unobserved.  Most empirical studies infer 
manipulation from observing “extreme” outcomes in which manipulation is likely to have 
occurred (e.g., incidences of accounting restatements and regulatory or legal action).  One 
concern with this measurement method is that it incorrectly classifies firms that manipulate 
accounting but that are not identified for restatement or for regulatory or legal action.  The 
potential for misclassification is a limitation of our study as well as of previous studies in this 
area.    
To reduce the risk of misclassification, we consider three different types of “accounting 
irregularities.”  The first is financial restatements related to accounting manipulation.  These data 
are obtained from Glass-Lewis & Co., which comprehensively collects restatement information 
from SEC filings, press releases, and other public data.  We identify accounting restatements 
between 2001 and 2005 that relate to perceived reporting manipulation classified as accounting 
fraud, an SEC investigation, a securities class action suit, improper reserve allowances, improper 
                                                 
5 The period 2001-2005 overlaps with regulatory environment changes (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Regulation FD, 
SEC Rule 10b5-1) that may affect inferences relative to those reported in studies that examine earlier periods.  We 
assess the sensitivity of our inferences to time-period choice in Section 6.4. 
6 The total of 19,705 pooled observations is the maximum number of CEO-firm-years available from Equilar.  
Eliminating observations with missing analysis data yields 13,706 pre-match CEO-firm-year observations.  
Requiring one-year-ahead data yields 10,773 CEO-firm-year observations for the propensity-score estimation.  The 
propensity-score matching algorithm yields a primary analysis sample of 9,118 CEO-firm-year observations (4,559 
matched pairs).    
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revenue recognition, or improper expense recognition.7  We code a restatement incident as the 
first fiscal year in which improper accounting occurred that subsequently necessitated a 
restatement.  As shown in Table 2 (Panel A), we identify 464 restatement incidents (3.4% of the 
total sample) across the time period covered in our analysis, with the most observations 
occurring during fiscal year 2004.   
The second accounting irregularity we consider is whether the firm was accused of 
accounting manipulation in a class action lawsuit.  We identify these firms in a database 
provided by Woodruff-Sawyer and Co. that records class action lawsuit damage periods between 
2001 and 2005. The lawsuits allege disclosure or financial-statement earnings estimate 
improprieties, financial misrepresentation, failure to adhere to GAAP, or restatement of 
earnings.8  We code a lawsuit incident as the first fiscal year in which the firm is named in a 
lawsuit damage period.  We identify 464 incidents of accounting-related lawsuit allegation 
periods (3.4% of the total sample) across the time period, with the most observations occurring 
during fiscal year 2001 (Table 2, Panel A).  
The final accounting irregularity we consider is whether the firm was accused of accounting 
manipulation in an AAER from the SEC.  We identify these firms from the comprehensive 
AAER listing provided on the SEC website for allegation periods between 2001 and 2005 that 
allege earnings-estimate improprieties, financial misrepresentation, or failure to adhere to 
                                                 
7 Revenue recognition restatements may result from changes in GAAP or GAAP enforcement (e.g., Staff 
Accounting Bulletin 101).  We classify these restatements as “manipulation,” since many GAAP enforcement 
changes resulted from regulatory perception that revenue was being misreported.  For sensitivity, we also restrict our 
restatement sample to the subsample of Glass-Lewis restatements that note revenue recognition, expense 
recognition, or concerns over reserves and allowances (Palmrose et al., 2004) and also note a material weakness, a 
late filing, an auditor change, or a restatement via 8-K filing.  Results for this restricted restatement sample are 
qualitatively similar to our reported results. 
8 Woodruff-Sawyer and Co. collects comprehensive class action lawsuit data to help estimate premiums for 
brokering directors and officers’ liability insurance.  A class action damage period is the period that precedes the 
lawsuit filing date during which the plaintiff alleges that damages (e.g., accounting manipulation) had occurred.  
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GAAP.9  We code an AAER incident as the first fiscal year in which the SEC alleges that 
accounting manipulation occurred, as detailed in the Enforcement Release.  Table 2 (Panel A) 
shows that there were only 157 incidents of accounting-related AAER allegation periods (1.2% 
of the total sample) across the time period, indicating that AAERs occur much less frequently 
than do both accounting restatements and accounting-related litigation.10   
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 
2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006), we measure CEO equity incentives as the portfolio delta, defined 
as the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the CEO’s equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the 
firm’s stock price.  The value of stock and restricted stock is assumed to change dollar-for-dollar 
with changes in the price of the underlying stock.  The value of stock options is assumed to 
change according to the option’s delta, which is the derivative of its Black-Scholes value with 
respect to the price of the underlying stock (Core and Guay, 2002).11 
 Since we are concerned with economically substantive differences in the level of equity 
incentives among executives, we partition equity incentives into five quintiles for our analyses.  
Using quintiles also allows us relax the assumption that CEO equity incentives have a monotonic 
                                                 
9 We define an enforcement action allegation period as the period that precedes the AAER filing date during which 
the SEC alleges that accounting manipulation had occurred.  For most AAER filings, the allegation period involves 
several years that well precede the AAER filing date.  It is common, for example, to observe 2007-year filings that 
refer back to allegation windows that occur between 2001 and 2005. 
10 Untabulated results show that all three measures display a positive contemporaneous correlation.  In particular, the 
Pearson correlation between (i) restatements and AAERs is 0.07, (ii) restatements and litigation is 0.10, and (iii) 
AAERs and litigation is 0.21.  All three are highly statistically significant (p < 0.001 using a two-tailed test).  There 
are 64 CEO-firm-year observations that experience both restatement and litigation events, 27 observations that 
experience both restatement and AAER events, 55 observations that experience both litigation and AAER events, 
and 13 observations that experience all three events contemporaneously. 
11 The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows.  Annualized volatility is calculated using 
continuously compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months of returns).  The 
risk-free rate is calculated using interpolated interest rate on a Treasury note with the same maturity (to the closest 
month) as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for the prevalence of early exercise.  
Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock price at the beginning 
of the month.  This is essentially the same method described by Core and Guay (2002). 
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association with accounting irregularities.12  Quintile rankings also exhibit better measurement 
properties than continuous incentive measurements do, since the empirical distribution of CEO 
portfolio deltas is right-skewed (Table 2, Panel B).  
Figure 1 presents frequency histograms for both contemporaneous and one-year-ahead 
accounting irregularities partitioned by CEO equity-incentives quintile.  Consistent with results 
from prior literature, Figure 1 provides some evidence of a positive (univariate) relationship 
between CEO equity incentives and the incidence of accounting irregularities, with the strongest 
monotonic pattern appearing for AAER and lawsuit outcomes.  Rank correlations (untabulated) 
confirm that AAERs (coefficient = 0.023, p-value = 0.0070) and lawsuits (coefficient = 0.052, p-
value = <0.0001) have a statistically positive association with CEO equity incentives.  However, 
equity incentives are correlated with many characteristics of executives’ contracting 
environments that could also produce univariate patterns similar to those in Figure 1.   
 
4. Research Method 
Since a pure experiment with random assignment is typically infeasible, most empirical 
accounting studies are observational in nature.   There is an extensive literature in econometrics 
and statistics that identifies conditions necessary to make causal statements in an observational 
study about the impact of the treatment variable (CEO equity incentives) on the outcome 
(accounting irregularities).  We summarize the theoretical framework in Appendix A.  
Prior research typically selects a set of firms with an observed accounting irregularity and 
then obtains another firm without an irregularity that is matched on year, industry, and size.13  
                                                 
12 Relaxing the monotonicity assumption also allows us to better isolate the location of any association between 
equity incentives and accounting irregularities on the support of the equity-incentives distribution.  In the extreme 
case, there could be a positive association at one end (e.g., high incentives) and a negative association at the other 
end (e.g., low incentives), and these separate effects would be obscured in a model that imposes monotonicity in the 
relationship.   
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The effect of incentives on the frequency of accounting irregularities is then inferred from the 
estimated coefficient on equity incentives.  Other variables are “controlled” through their 
inclusion in the regression estimation.     
The validity of this common research design relies on several critical assumptions.  As 
discussed more fully in Appendix B, the partial-matched econometric method produces unbiased 
parameter estimates only if there is an identical functional relationship between the control 
variables and the outcome variable for each level of treatment.14  If instead the true relationship 
between the controls and the outcome variable either differs across levels of treatment or is 
inconsistent with the functional form imposed by the research design, the partial-matched 
econometric method will produce biased parameter estimates.  Further, this misspecification 
increases the likelihood of drawing an erroneous conclusion about the existence of a causal effect 
of the treatment. 
We adopt an alternative approach that is more robust to misspecification of the functional 
form of the underlying relationship between equity incentives and accounting irregularities.  
Specifically, we use a matched-pair research design that matches a treatment firm with a control 
firm that is similar across all observable relevant variables.  Our matching algorithm uses the 
common partial-match variables plus all other variables that would typically be included as 
control variables.  Matching on these additional variables relaxes the assumption of a constant 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Most prior studies match on differences in the outcome rather than on differences in the treatment.  The 
distinction between the two alternative research designs has important inferential implications, since only the latter 
isolates the relationship of interest.  Because matching on the outcome does not remove variation in control 
variables, the research design implicitly searches for any cause(s) of an effect.  In contrast, to the extent it is possible 
to achieve covariate balance, matching on the treatment removes variation in other potentially confounding variables 
to isolate the effect of a treatment of interest.  Further, matching on the outcome has two key limitations.  First, 
inferences from this design rely heavily on the assumed functional form of the relationship (see Appendix B).  
Second, this design may induce low power, since it does not ensure that variation remains in the treatment variable 
of interest (see Section 6.3).  In contrast, matching on the treatment is analogous to a randomized experiment in 
which the randomized treatment assignment deliberately induces variation in treatment. 
14 Logistic regression, for example, assumes that a linear functional relationship exists between the log of the odds 
ratio and the observable predictor variables. 
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functional relationship with the outcome variable and therefore is robust to misspecification of 
the functional form (see Appendix A).  
4.1 Implementation of the Propensity-Score Matched-Pairs Design  
Our matched-pair research design consists of five steps.  First, we estimate an ordered 
logistic propensity-score model, which is the probability that an executive will receive a certain 
level of equity incentives (i.e., the treatment) conditional on observable features of the 
contracting environment.  Second, we form matched pairs by identifying the pairings that result 
in observations with the smallest propensity-score differences (i.e., the most similar observed 
contracting environments) but the greatest difference in actual CEO equity incentives (i.e., the 
most dissimilar contracts).  Third, we examine the covariate balance between the treatment and 
control samples and (if necessary) remove the most dissimilar matched pairs to achieve better 
control for potentially confounding factors.15  Fourth, we examine the relationship between 
equity incentives and accounting irregularities by assessing whether the frequency of accounting 
irregularities is significantly different between the treatment and control groups.  Fifth, we 
estimate the sensitivity of reported results to potential hidden bias by relaxing the assumption 
that matched observations have an equal probability of receiving a certain level of treatment 
conditional on the observable contracting environment (Rosenbaum, 2002).  The final step 
explicitly acknowledges that unobservable contracting characteristics can affect each executive’s 
level of equity incentives (e.g., endogenous matching of executives and contracts on 
unobservable firm and CEO characteristics such as CEO risk aversion).  This assessment 
                                                 
15 It is important to note that this step is not ad hoc and does not induce estimation bias.  This step simply identifies 
and then removes matched pairs for which the matching algorithm did not produce an effective covariate match 
(without using any information about the outcome variable).  Removing these observations alleviates inference 
problems that are discussed in Appendix B. 
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quantifies the potential impact of this confounding effect on the observed statistical association 
between the treatment variable and the outcome. 
4.1.1 Propensity-Score Model 
One problem with implementing a matched-pair research design is the difficulty of obtaining 
proper matches when each observation is characterized by many relevant dimensions (or 
covariates).  As the number of dimensions increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to find 
pairs of observations that are similar along all of these dimensions.  Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) develop the propensity score as a way to address this dimensionality problem.  In 
particular, the propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving some level of treatment 
given the observable covariates.16   
The treatment of interest in this study is the level of CEO equity incentives, so we require a 
propensity-score model of the conditional probability of receiving a certain level of equity 
incentives given observable features of a CEO’s contracting environment.  Prior theoretical and 
empirical research suggests a number of economic and governance characteristics that are 
associated with the level of CEO equity incentives, and we draw on this literature to specify the 
propensity-score model.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985), for example, suggest that larger firms and 
firms with greater monitoring difficulties will provide greater CEO incentives.  Dechow and 
Sloan (1991) suggest that firms with CEO horizon problems will provide greater CEO equity 
incentives.  Finally, Core et al. (1999) suggest that firm governance characteristics, in part, 
determine CEO equity incentives.  Therefore, we include proxies for size (market capitalization), 
complexity (idiosyncratic risk), growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), monitoring 
                                                 
16 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) discuss the necessary conditions for matching on the propensity score (which is a 
scalar value) rather than matching on each of the individual covariates.  One condition is that the outcome is 
independent of the treatment given the observed covariates.  A second condition is that the propensity score cannot 
perfectly classify observations into the treatment or control groups.  This is necessary to ensure that for each 
observation, there is a potential match that has a similar probability of receiving the treatment.   
16 
 
(leverage), CEO horizon problems (CEO tenure), and firm-governance characteristics (e.g., the 
number of directors, the number of activist shareholders) in the propensity-score estimation.     
We estimate the following ordered logistic propensity-score model, annually, for the CEOs in 
our sample: 
Pr(EqIncQuint) =     (1)
         
αk  + β1 Leveragei + β2 Log(MarketCap)i + 
β3 Log(Idiosyncrisk)i + β4 MkttoBooki + β5 Log(1 + Tenurei) + 
β6 OutsideChmni + β7 OutsideLdDiri + β8 CEOApptdOutsDirsi + 
β9 StaggeredBdi + β10 PctOldOutsDirsi + β11 PctBusyOutsDirsi + 
β12 PctFoundingDirsi + β13 OutsideDirHoldsi t + β14 Log(1+NumberDirsi) + 
β15 PctFinExpsAudi + β16 DirCompMixi + β17 Log(1+NumInstOwnsi)  
β18 Log(1+NumBlockhldrsi) + β19 Log(1 +Activistsi) + εi.   
 
Variables are defined in Appendix C.  The independent variables in equation (1) are measured in 
the year prior to equity-incentives measurement, and descriptive statistics for these variables are 
presented in Table 2 (Panel C).17 
Table 3 reports the aggregated estimates of the annual ordered logistic propensity-score 
regression of the level of equity incentives.18  The first column presents the average of the annual 
coefficient estimates, and the second column reports an aggregated z-statistic.19  The final two 
                                                 
17 Although we select the predictor variables in equation (1) based on prior research, we acknowledge that this 
choice process is somewhat arbitrary.  An alternative research design would be to include only the traditional 
economic determinants of CEO incentives, as opposed to also including corporate governance variables.  We 
include the governance variables because prior research shows that they are important determinants of the level of 
equity incentives (e.g., Core et al., 1999).  In addition, if the propensity score only uses economic determinants, 
there is a high likelihood that the resulting matches will not be balanced with respect to the governance variables.  
This would result in an identification problem which would make it difficult to determine whether the accounting 
irregularities are caused by differences in the level of equity incentives, corporate governance, or both.  
18 In untabulated sensitivity analyses, we include two-digit SIC code as an additional propensity score estimation 
covariate.  We also alter the algorithm to require matching from firms with the same two-digit SIC code.  Both 
procedures produce fewer matches and modestly worse covariate balance across the treatment and control samples, 
but neither alters our primary inferences.   
19  The aggregated z-statistic is calculated as the sum of the individual annual z-statistics divided by the square root 
of the number of years for which the propensity score model is estimated.  The construction of this aggregate z-
statistic assumes that each of the annual estimates is independent.  However, the significance of either the individual 
or aggregated results presented in Table 3 does not affect our primary analysis of the relationship between equity 
incentives and accounting irregularities since matched pairs are formed annually based on the respective propensity 
score model.  
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columns report the number of years in which the sign of each annual coefficient estimate is 
positive and negative, respectively. 
Our results are generally consistent with prior research, in that we find that CEO equity 
incentives are greater at larger firms, firms with growth opportunities, and firms with longer-
tenured CEOs.  In addition, we find that equity incentives are lower at firms with stronger 
monitoring (e.g., outside chairman, lead director, number of institutional shareholders, and 
number of activist shareholders).  We also observe that equity incentives exhibit a positive 
association with the percentage of the outside directors appointed by the CEO, the percentage of 
founders on the board, the percentage of shares held by the outside directors, and the degree to 
which equity incentives are used to compensate outside directors.  Finally, Table 3 indicates that 
the propensity-score model has reasonable explanatory power (Adj. Pseudo-R2 = 27.3%).  This is  
important, since a propensity score with very low explanatory power effectively induces random 
matching, which increases the likelihood that inferences will be confounded by correlated 
omitted variables. 
4.1.2 Matching Algorithm 
     In the case where a binary treatment is present (i.e., treatment or no treatment), matched pairs 
are formed by selecting an observation that received the treatment and selecting another 
observation with the closest propensity score that did not receive the treatment.  Since we use 
CEO equity-incentive quintiles as our treatment, matching becomes an optimization problem of 
minimizing a function of the aggregate distances between the propensity scores of the matched 
pairs.  We follow the approach outlined in Lu et al. (2001) and simultaneously minimize the 
difference between propensity scores and maximize the difference between equity-incentive 
levels with the following distance metric:  
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Δi,j =   ∞    if δi = δj,    (2) 
PScore is the propensity score computed from equation (1), δ is each observation’s equity-
incentive quintile, and i, j index the individual observations.20  We then use a nonbipartite 
algorithm to identify, across all possible permutations, the minimum sum of pairwise distances, 
∑Δ ji , for i ≠ j, where each observation is paired with another and observations can be used only 
once for matching (i.e., matching without replacement).21  In particular, we employ the 
nonbipartite matching algorithm suggested by Derigs (1988), which is an “optimal” algorithm in 
the sense that it considers the potential distances between other matched pairs when forming a 
particular matched pair (Lu et al., 2001).   
The distribution of matched pairs according to their pairwise equity-incentive quintiles is 
presented in Table 4.  The columns indicate the quintile of the treatment observation in each 
matched pair, while the rows indicate the quintile of its control counterpart.  For example, the 
(3,5) element of the matrix is 404, which indicates that there are 404 matched pairs for which the 
treatment is in the highest quintile of equity incentives (i.e., five) and the control is in the middle 
quintile of equity incentives (i.e., three).  The diagonal elements are all zero, since we preclude 
matches with identical equity-incentive levels.  Not surprisingly, most matched pairs (72.36%) 
lie immediately off the diagonal, where the difference in the quintile rank of incentives between 
the treatment and control is one.  Only 4.96% of the paired observations have a difference of at 
                                                 
20 The distance metric can be generalized to the case where the treatment variable (i.e., denominator) is continuous.  
See Hirano and Imbens (2004) for a theoretical discussion and Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker (2009) and 
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2009) for examples of implementing this approach. 
21 It is not clear whether prior studies match with or without replacement.  If matching is done with replacement and 
the same firm is included in multiple matches, it is necessary to adjust (increase) the standard error used for 
statistical tests.  Depending on the correlation across matches, this adjustment can be quite large.  In general, the 
distinction between matching with and without replacement represents a tradeoff of efficiency versus bias.  
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least three quintiles.  This result indicates that CEOs with similar contracting environments tend 
to have similar levels of equity incentives and that the propensity-score estimation method 
reasonably predicts CEO equity-incentive levels.   
4.1.3. Covariate Balance Between Treatment and Control Samples 
Covariate balance is achieved if both the treatment and control groups appear similar along 
their observable dimensions except for their level of equity incentives.  An adequate degree of 
covariate balance is necessary to properly account for the confounding effects of the observed 
control variables used to match the observations.  If balance is not achieved, it may be necessary 
to remove the matched pairs that contributed to the imbalance.22  Examining covariate balance is 
important also because it can highlight potential identification problems.  If there is a variable for 
which it is not possible to achieve adequate balance across the treatment and control groups, the 
treatment effect cannot be identified by the research design.  For example, assume that the 
treatment group (CEOs with high equity incentives) always consists of larger firms than the 
control group (CEOs with low equity incentives).  This setting will produce an identification 
problem, because any observed difference in outcome between the treatment and control groups 
cannot be uniquely attributed to either the treatment or to firm size. 
To assess covariate balance between the treatment and control groups, we report both a 
parametric t-test of the difference in means and a nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
of the difference between two distributions.23  Table 5 presents the means and medians of the 
                                                 
22 Although removing observations can improve covariate balance, it may also restrict the range over which the 
researcher can make statements about the relationship between the treatment and the outcome of interest.  It is only 
appropriate to draw inferences from within the overlapping support of the distributions.  Inferences from outside this 
range are based on extrapolation and rely on an assumption about the functional form of the relationship outside this 
range (e.g., linearity).   
23 The t-test assumes normality of the data, while the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test 
and is sensitive to differences in both the location and shape of the empirical distributions of the samples.  Following 
Sekhon (2007), we bootstrap the KS test statistic with 2,000 bootstrap samples because “the bootstrapped 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, unlike the standard test, provides correct coverage even when there are point masses in 
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treatment and control groups along with the p-values (two-tailed) for both the t-test and the KS-
test.  The p-values for the t-test and KS-test indicate that the matching algorithm was successful 
in achieving balance for most covariates.  In particular, 19 of the 20 t-tests and 13 of the 20 KS-
tests are not statistically significant (p > 0.05, two-tailed).  Moreover, even in the cases in which 
the means and medians are statistically different, the economic differences between the treatment 
and control sample are very small.  Statistical significance appears to occur because we have a 
relatively large sample size for these tests.  These results suggest that the covariates are generally 
balanced across the treatment and control samples and that differences in these observed 
variables across the treatment and control groups are not likely to confound our estimates of the 
average treatment effect.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Primary Results 
     Table 6 presents our primary results regarding the relationship between equity incentives and 
accounting irregularities.  The formal statistical test of this relationship entails examining the 
discordant frequency of accounting irregularities that are associated with a particular treatment 
level.24,25  Accounting irregularities are counted for the first year in which an accounting-
                                                                                                                                                             
the distributions being compared.”  This is important in our cases, since we include a number of dichotomous 
variables in our specification.  
24 A pair of observations is concordant if each observation experiences the same outcome and discordant if each has 
a different outcome. We assess the significance between the number of concordant and discordant pairs using 
McNemar’s (1947) χ2 statistic.  With small samples, the McNemar’s χ2 may be misleading and an exact cumulative 
binominal test should be used (Liddell, 1983).  None of our inferences change when this exact test is used for 
evaluating the results in Table 6. 
25  When it is not possible to achieve adequate covariate balance, an alternative approach is to form matched pairs 
with the propensity scores and then estimate a (conditional logistic) regression of the outcome as a function of 
treatment and the vector of control variables used in the propensity-score model (Ho et al., 2007).  For sensitivity, 
we estimate conditional logistic regressions of accounting irregularities on the level of equity incentives and the 
controls that were used in the propensity-score estimation regression.  Results (untabulated) are similar to those 
reported in Table 6; an outcome that is not surprising given the high degree of covariate balance achieved through 
first-stage matching. 
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manipulation-related restatement is observed (Panel A), in which the firm is involved in a class 
action damage period (Panel B), or in which the firm is involved in an AAER damage period 
(Panel C).26   
     For each accounting irregularity, we present the results for both the contemporaneous and 
one-year-ahead relationship in three ways that take advantage of different amounts of 
information about the equity-incentives quintile of the treatment and control observation.  First, 
we present results according to each possible pairing of equity-incentives quintile.  Since there 
are five levels of equity incentives and we preclude a matched pair from having an identical level 
of equity incentives, there are ten possible combinations for each pair.  This is the finest level of 
aggregation and preserves information about both the magnitude of the difference in the level of 
equity incentives and the location on the support of the equity-incentive distribution.  Second, we 
group matched pairs according to the difference in equity-incentive quintiles between the 
treatment and control observations.  This is a more coarse level of aggregation that preserves 
information about the difference in the level of equity incentives between the treatment and 
control observations but ignores information about their location on the support of the equity-
incentive distribution (e.g., a 5-3 quintile pair is treated the same as a 3-1 quintile pair because 
they both represent a difference of two quintiles between the treatment and control observations).  
Third, we pool all of the treatment and control observations and look for differences in the 
incidence of accounting irregularities between these two groups.  This is the coarsest level of 
aggregation and ignores information about both the magnitude and location of the equity 
incentives.  It considers only whether each observation in a matched pair has a higher or lower 
level of equity incentives.  It does, however, have the benefit of maximizing the sample size, 
                                                 
26 It is extremely rare for the same firm to appear in multiple discordant pairs.  Therefore, correlation across 
observations from the same firm is unlikely to induce inference problems.  Cross-sectional correlation is also not 
likely to induce inference problems, since treatment and control firms are matched in the same year.   
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which increases the power of the test.  To help assess the economic magnitude of incentive-level 
differences between the treatment and control groups, Table 6 also reports $Incent, which is the 
median portfolio delta for matched observations reported in the frequency cells.27   
     The results presented in Table 6 (Panel A) do not support the notion that higher equity-
incentive levels are associated with a greater incidence of accounting-related restatements.  
There are no instances of statistically larger restatement frequencies for treatment observations 
relative to control observations for any comparison.  In contrast, we find some modest evidence 
consistent with the alternative explanation that equity incentives align managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders.  When there is a difference of one between the level of equity incentives in 
the treatment and control observations (i.e., DiffEqIncQuint = 1), there are 34 (= 119 – 153) 
more restatement incidents observed in the subsequent year (p-value = 0.045) for the firms with 
lower incentives (control firms) relative to the firms with higher incentives (treatment firms).   
The results presented in Table 6 (Panel B) are similar to those in Panel A.  We find no 
evidence that higher equity incentives are associated with a higher frequency of accounting-
related lawsuits.  Instead, the pooled results for contemporaneous and one-year-ahead lawsuit 
frequency show more lawsuits for firms with lower incentives relative to firms with higher 
incentives (p-value = 0.018 and 0.025, respectively).  Looking forward one year, there is also 
evidence of fewer lawsuits at firms with lower equity incentives, where the equity incentives 
differ by two quintiles (p-value 0.031).   
Finally, the results in Table 6 (Panel C), which relates to AAER damage periods, are 
consistent with those in Panels A and B.  There is no evidence of a positive association between 
                                                 
27 Table 6 reports $Incent only when the difference between equity incentives quintiles is equal to one (and for 
pooled data), since this reflects the minimum equity-incentive distance and there is sufficient sample size for tests of 
median differences.  All treatment-control $Incent differences are statistically significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed) using 
a Kruskal-Wallis test. 
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equity incentives and the incidence of AAER damage periods.  However, there is evidence that 
higher equity incentives are associated with a lower incidence of AAERs.  Specifically, when 
observations are pooled and when the difference in the level of equity incentives is one or two, 
there are more contemporaneous AAERs for the control firms relative to the treatment firms (p-
value = 0.010, 0.070, and 0.066, respectively).   
Overall, the results in Table 6 do not provide evidence of a positive association between 
equity incentives and the frequency of accounting irregularities.  In contrast, there is a modest 
negative association between incentives and the frequency of accounting irregularities.  Thus, 
our results are more consistent with incentive alignment rather than with managerial rent 
extraction.   
5.2. Hidden Bias Sensitivity 
It is well known that the results of non-experimental empirical studies are susceptible to 
hidden bias caused by the omission of an unobservable yet relevant variable (i.e., a correlated 
omitted variable).  Surprisingly, few empirical accounting studies attempt to quantify the 
potential effects of hidden bias on their primary conclusions.  We use a bounding approach 
outlined by Rosenbaum (2002) and DiPrete and Gangl (2004) to assess the sensitivity of our 
inferences to potential hidden bias that might exist, because of endogenous matching of 
executives and equity-incentive contracts and other similar factors.28  Rosenbaum (2002) and 
DiPrete and Gangl (2004) note that although propensity-score matching effectively alleviates 
                                                 
28 It is quite likely that hidden bias is present in this study, as well as the papers summarized in Table 1, because of 
selection on unobservables (Heckman and Hotz, 1989).  Selection on unobservables occurs when it is not possible to 
observe all of the covariates that affect a decision maker’s selection.  For example, if certain firms use contracts with 
a high level of equity incentives to select more risk-seeking executives and more risk-seeking executives choose 
firms that offer riskier compensation packages (with higher equity incentives), there is endogenous matching on 
executive risk aversion.  If risk-seeking executives are also more likely to manipulate accounting reports, this 
endogenous matching on an unobservable variable (i.e., the degree of CEO risk aversion) would induce hidden bias 
in our results, and we might misattribute an difference in the frequency of accounting irregularities to differences in 
the level of CEO equity incentives, rather than to differences in the degree of CEO risk aversion.  
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overt bias relating to observable covariates, it does not remove hidden bias that might arise from 
unobserved covariates.  Both studies outline an approach to identify the limits at which an 
unobservable confounding variable would alter inferences that can be drawn from an analysis 
based on only the observed variables.   
     Rosenbaum (2002) shows that hidden bias exists if two observations (denoted i and j) have 
the same observed x covariates but different probabilities (denoted as π) of receiving treatment 
because of some unobserved factor.  In the case of a binary treatment, the odds that each 
observation, i and j, receive treatment are πi/(1−πi) and πj/(1−πj), respectively.  Since these two 
observations look similar across their observable covariates x, they would be paired by a 
matching algorithm to minimize overt bias.  If the odds ratio (denoted as Γ by Rosenbaum, 2002) 
does not equal one, each observation in a matched pair has an unequal probability of receiving 
treatment and there is a hidden bias inherent in the analysis.  Rosenbaum (2002) shows that 
relaxing the assumption that Γ = 1 (i.e., that two observations with identical observable 
covariates have an identical probability of receiving treatment) can be used to compute 
significance test boundaries under different assumptions about the strength of the hidden bias 
that is necessary to alter the qualitative inferences from a study.   
We assess the sensitivity of observed statistically significant results by estimating the 
boundary Γ values for cases in which the McNemar’s test p-values exceed 0.10 (two-tailed).  
Specifically, in the cases in which there is a statistically significant difference between the 
outcomes of the treatment and control groups, we calculate the value of Γ (or the odds ratio) at 
which a significance level of 0.10 would be obtained.  These Γ values allow us to quantify the 
amount of hidden bias necessary to invalidate the statistical significance that results from the 
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assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of 
receiving the treatment.   
These boundary values are presented (where applicable) in Table 6.  We find that there are 
several cases in which a statistically significant relationship is observed, yet only a small Γ value 
is needed to reduce the statistical significance of the result.29  This finding suggests that these 
results are very sensitive to hidden bias and should be interpreted with caution.  For example, 
consider the case of one-year-ahead restatements related to accounting manipulation for the 5-4 
incentive quintile pairs presented in Panel A of Table 6.  In this case, there are 55 restatements 
observed from the control group and 31 restatements observed from the treatment group.  
Although this difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.013), a value of Γ = 1.37 would 
result in a p-value of 0.10.  Therefore, this result would be marginally significant (p-value = 
0.10) if control firms were actually 1.37 times more (rather than equally) likely to receive lower 
equity incentives than treatment firms, after conditioning on observable features of the 
contracting environment using the propensity score.   
There are also cases in which the observed results are much less sensitive to hidden bias.  For 
example, Panel C of Table 6 reports nine AAER incidents for the fifth incentive quintile and 29 
AAER incidents for the fourth incentive quintile in the contemporaneous AAER estimation (p-
value = 0.002).  For this comparison, we find that Γ = 6.26, which provides robust support for the 
inference that very high levels of CEO equity incentives minimize AAER frequency. 
                                                 
29 To our knowledge, no objective benchmark exists to determine whether a given Γ is “large” or “small.”  
Therefore, the designation is subjective and depends on the reader’s prior beliefs as to the degree of endogenous 
selection on unobservable factors (e.g., risk-aversion, talent, productivity) in CEO contracting.  Larger values of Γ, 
however, provide greater confidence that results are robust to hidden bias.  Smaller values of Γ indicate that results 
are sensitive to hidden bias, thereby confounding inferences from the analysis.  Future research should consider 
identifying threshold Γ values, perhaps through gathering and evaluating an empirical distribution of Γ values 
implicit in other studies.  An alternative approach outlined by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) is to express the 
degree of selection on unobservable factors relative to the degree of selection on observable factors that would be 
necessary to alter the statistical significance of the results. 
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Overall, there is mixed evidence on whether results are robust to hidden bias.  The most 
robust results occur in the higher quintiles of the equity-incentive distribution.  As discussed 
above, these results also provide some evidence of a negative association between incentives and 
irregularities.  Thus, the results that appear least sensitive to potential hidden bias are those that 
are consistent with an incentive-alignment explanation.   
 
6. Sensitivity Analyses 
6.1. Proxy for CEO Equity Incentives 
It is possible that our proxy for equity incentives does not adequately measure the degree to 
which CEOs’ utility is sensitive to changes in firm value.  To assess the sensitivity of our results 
to our choice of equity-incentive proxy, we consider an alternative equity-incentive measure, 
EqCompMix.  This measure is computed as the ratio of the risk-neutral dollar value of options 
plus restricted stock compensation to the risk-neutral value of total annual compensation (i.e., 
stock options, restricted stock, salary, bonus, and target long-term incentive-plan payouts).  This 
(or a similar) incentive measure has been used in prior studies (e.g., Erickson, Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2007; Baber et al. 2007).  In addition, compensation consultants commonly use equity 
mix in their recommendations to the board concerning executive compensation, and it may be a 
suitable alternative proxy for managerial incentives.  After re-estimating the propensity-score 
model, matching algorithm, and primary tests, we find results (untabulated) to be generally 
similar to those reported in Table 6.   
6.2. Equilar Versus ExecuComp Sample 
It is possible that our results are sensitive to sample selection because prior studies generally 
use data from larger and more mature firms that comprise the ExecuComp database.  To evaluate 
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this possibility, we re-estimate our results after constraining the sample to the subset of Equilar 
firms that also appear in the ExecuComp database.  Our results (not tabulated) are consistent 
with those reported in Table 6.   
6.3. Econometric Approach 
Since the propensity-score matched-pair research design is quite different from the more 
traditional outcome-matched logistic regression, it is instructive to examine the sensitivity of our 
results to the choice of econometric approach.   In Table 7 (Panel A), we report conditional 
logistic estimates from an outcome-matched sample.  This sample was generated by matching 
(without replacement) firms with an accounting irregularity to firms without an accounting 
irregularity by year, two-digit SIC code, and total assets.  The remaining variables from the 
propensity-score estimation (see Table 3) are included as controls.  In contrast to the propensity-
score results in Table 6, we find little statistically significant evidence of an association between 
accounting irregularities and equity incentives.30   
To explore the sensitivity of our results further, Table 7 (Panel B) provides comparative 
results of the covariate balance obtained from propensity-score matching with those obtained 
from standard partial outcome-based matching.  Although it is difficult to make direct 
comparisons with prior studies because of differences in sample composition and sample size, 
these results show that standard partial outcome-matching generally does not achieve balance for 
Leverage and Log(Idiosyncrisk) and often does not achieve balance for MkttoBook.  In contrast, 
propensity-score matching appears to achieve balance for Leverage and yields generally smaller 
median differences for Log(Idiosyncrisk) and MkttoBook across samples.  These results at least 
                                                 
30 The only statistically significant difference is observed for one-year-ahead AAERs for which the estimated 
coefficient for equity quintile three is smaller than both the estimated coefficients for equity quintiles two and four.  
These results are mixed and are inconsistent with results in Table 6. 
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suggest the possibility that the difference in results between Table 6 and Table 7 is related to the 
absence of covariate balance in the outcome-matched sample. 
Equally important, covariate balance comparisons clearly show that propensity-score 
matching induces considerably more variation in the primary variable of interest, PortDelta.  
This is an important distinction, because increasing variation in the treatment variable will 
generate more powerful tests of the relationship between equity incentives and accounting 
irregularities.   
6.4. Time Period  
To assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative (earlier) time periods, we compare the 
results produced by standard partial outcome-matched logistic regression and the propensity 
score using the AAER sample in Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006).  In this test, we examine 
the association between contemporaneous AAERs and the level of equity incentives.  Following 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), each AAER firm is matched to two firms without an 
AAER from the same year, two-digit SIC code, and similar total assets.  Although Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) show that conditional logistic regression is more appropriate when the sample 
if formed by matching on both the dependent and independent variables, we report the results for 
both standard logistic and conditional logistic estimation in Table 8.31  We include control 
variables used by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) in this estimation.    
                                                 
31 Accounting researchers often cite Maddala (1991) to justify estimation methods regarding limited dependent 
variables.  In limited dependent variable regressions (e.g., logit or probit) in which observations are matched based 
on outcome alone, Maddala (1991) shows that bias is observed only in the intercept.  Therefore, in this specific 
setting, one can draw unbiased inferences from non-intercept coefficients and can correct for the bias in the intercept 
(e.g., King and Zeng, 2001).  Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) show, however, that conditional logistic regression is 
required to produce appropriate inferences in cases in which observations are matched based on outcome and on 
selected control variables.  In this specific setting, conditional logistic regression is necessary to account for the lack 
of independence between matched pairs in the sample, because pair component observations are not randomly 
sampled.  When Maddala (1991, p. 790) states that the conditional logit “… is not relevant for the problems in 
accounting that we are dealing with,” he is not considering cases in which the sample is formed by matching on both 
the dependent and selected independent variables.. 
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Consistent with Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), we do not observe evidence of a 
relationship between the incidence of AAERs and the level of CEO equity incentives from 
estimates produced by standard logistic regression.  However, conditional logistic regression 
provides some evidence of a positive association between the incidence of AAERs and the level 
of CEO equity incentives.  The association is most pronounced for CEOs in the highest incentive 
quintile and is more consistent with results from several prior studies (Table 1).  This finding 
also illustrates that inferences from a matched sample are sensitive to the choice of standard or 
conditional logistic estimation.32  
Finally, we estimate the results from a propensity-score matched-pair design within this 
sample.33  Similar to the conditional logistic regression results, Table 8 (Panel B) reports 
evidence of a positive association between the incidence of AAERs and the level of CEO equity 
incentives at the highest level of the equity-incentive distribution.  However, in contrast to 
conditional logistic results in Table 8 (Panel A), Panel B also reports evidence of a negative 
association between the incidence of AAERs and the level of CEO equity incentives at the lowest 
level of the equity-incentive distribution.  Γ values reported in Panel B indicate that the positive 
association observed at the upper end of the equity-incentive distribution is considerably more 
sensitive to potential hidden bias relative to the negative association observed at the lower end of 
the equity-incentive distribution. 
There are two observations worth noting in this analysis.  First, results are sensitive to 
research design choice and appear to be sensitive to the time period selected.  Second, a non-
                                                 
32 Although we followed the methods used by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) to select our control sample, 
our control sample may differ from theirs.  Thus, we cannot make a direct comparison between the results in Table 8 
and those in Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006). 
33 The CEO incentive propensity score is estimated as a function of the regressors reported in Erickson, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2006).  Specifically, EqIncQuint = β1  + β2 CEO=CHAIR + β3 NUMMTGS + β4 FINANCING + β5 
LEVERAGE + β6 MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY + β7 ALTMAN’S Z + β8 BOOK TO MARKET + β9 EARNINGS TO 
PRICE + β10 RET ON ASSETS + β11 SALES GROWTH + β12 AGE OF FIRM + β13 M&A IN FIRST YEAR OF 
FRAUD + β14  STOCK VOLATILITY + β15 CEO TENURE + β16 MISSING CEO  TENURE + εi.. 
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monotonic relationship may exist between equity incentives and accounting irregularities.  
Therefore, it is difficult assess the relationship between equity incentives and accounting 
irregularities without considering research design choices that relax assumptions regarding the 
functional form linking treatment and control variables to the outcome. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
     The widespread use of “high-powered” equity incentives for CEOs and other top executives 
has generated interest in assessing whether these incentives align managers’ interests with those 
of shareholders or whether they instead induce managers to manipulate accounting information 
for personal gain.  A number of studies have examined this question, but their evidence is quite 
mixed regarding the relationship between equity incentives and various accounting irregularities.  
This paper examines this research question using a larger sample that is more representative of 
the economy and an econometric approach that better alleviates overt bias and provides an 
assessment of hidden bias.      
     Using a propensity-score matched-pair research design that is robust to misspecification of 
the underlying functional form that confounds the traditional logistic regression approaches, we 
find little evidence of a positive relationship between CEO equity incentives and the incidence of 
accounting-related restatements, shareholder lawsuits alleging accounting manipulation, and 
AAERs.  If anything, our results suggest that higher equity-based compensation and holdings 
may actually reduce the incidence of improper financial reporting.  Specifically, we find some 
evidence that firms at which the CEO has greater equity incentives have a lower frequency of 
accounting irregularities than do firms with similar contracting environments at which the CEO 
has a relatively lower level of equity incentives.   
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     Unlike most prior research, our results are most consistent with the notion that equity 
incentives play a role in aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders with regard to 
financial reporting.  In sensitivity analyses, we find results that are similar when we use CEO 
equity mix (rather than portfolio delta) and when we constrain our sample to ExecuComp (rather 
than Equilar) firms.   
Results generated with a propensity-score matched-pair research design can be quite different 
from those produced using standard and conditional logistic regression.  Since the propensity-
score approach is robust to the functional form linking control variables to the outcome, 
propensity-score results provide a better basis for statistical inference about the effect of the 
treatment in the absence of precise knowledge about the underlying structural relationship among 
the variables of interest.  Moreover, the propensity-score approach allows for an explicit 
assessment for the sensitivity of the results to hidden bias (e.g., correlated omitted variables).  
Finally, there seems to be a temporal aspect for this research question, and this aspect may 
account for some of the differences between our results and those of prior research.   
One important question that we do not answer is what, if not equity incentives, compels 
managers to engage in accounting manipulation.  It would be useful for future research to 
develop and estimate structural models of managerial decisions regarding accounting 
manipulation.  At this point, we do not know why executives engage in illegal and unethical 
behavior that can result in substantial legal and human-capital costs (e.g., Armstrong and 
Larcker, 2009).  To gain further insight into this question, future research might consider 
behavioral explanations in addition to traditional economic or agency rationalizations.  
Manipulative behavior may result from social influence, where other firms, for example, 
manipulate accounting and thus allow executives to infer that this behavior is “legitimate.” 
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Alternatively, this behavior may be a function of lax ethical norms in the firm or the personal 
characteristics of executives engaged in accounting irregularities (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 
2008).  Research in this direction would be likely to enhance our understanding of the accounting 
irregularities.   
Finally, propensity-score methods should be considered for future empirical accounting 
research in which the hypothesized causal variable is an endogenous choice (except, perhaps, in 
settings in which the outcome variable is very costly to collect).  In particular, researchers should 
use propensity-score methods to generate matched pairs that induce maximum variation in the 
causal variable of interest (i.e., a full sample match).  This approach is consistent with 
fundamental research in econometrics and statistics and is an arguably superior econometric 
approach to matching on the outcome variable and relying on a regression model to control for 
confounding variables (i.e., a partial match).  Future research should also consider bounding 
methods to explicitly quantify the sensitivity of the results for the primary causal variable to 
unobserved correlated omitted variables.  This will provide readers with the necessary 
information to assess the extent to which reported results are robust to correlated omitted 
variable and endogeneity concerns.   
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Appendix A.  Background for an Observational Study 
     The potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Holland, 1986; Heckman and 
Navarro-Lozano ,2004) is useful for illustrating the features of an observational study.  Assume 
that, for each individual i, there is an indicator Di that equals one if the individual receives the 
treatment (e.g., high equity incentives) and equals zero otherwise.  For each individual there is a 
potential outcome (e.g., accounting irregularity) if the individual receives the treatment, denoted 
Y1, and another potential outcome (e.g., no accounting irregularity) if the individual does not 
receive the treatment, denoted Y0.  The potential outcomes for each individual are defined as Yi = 
Yi(Di), and these are a function of both observable (denoted by X) and unobservable outcome-
specific covariates (denoted by ε0 and ε1).34  In the case of additive separability, we can write 
these outcomes as follows. 
Y1 = μ1(X) + ε1         (A1a) 
Y0 = μ0(X) + ε0.        (A1b) 
The individual-level treatment effect, Δ = (Y1 – Y0), represents the effect of the treatment on a 
particular individual.35  Although this quantity exists in theory, it cannot be observed because 
only one of the two potential outcomes is observed for any particular individual.  The outcome 
that did not occur (e.g., Y0 if the treatment was not received) is referred to as the “counterfactual” 
outcome, and its unobservability creates an identification problem that precludes the 
determination of the treatment effect for a specific individual.      
                                                 
34  The unobservable components ε0 and ε1 are indexed separately to allow for the possibility that these factors differ 
according to whether treatment was received.  If the incidence of treatment is related to unobservables ε0 and ε1, then 
there is an endogenous relationship known as selection on the unobservables (Heckman and Robb, 1985), which 
results in hidden bias.  Below, we discuss how bounds can be established on the size of this relationship relative to 
the relationship between the outcome and the observable variables. 
35  A treatment effect is often referred to as a “causal effect,” which is defined as the difference between an observed 
outcome and its unobserved, counterfactual outcome. 
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     One way to address this identification problem is to group observations according to whether 
they received the treatment and estimate the difference between the average outcomes of the 
treatment and control groups (i.e., those that did and did not receive the treatment, respectively), 
which can identify the average treatment effect (ATE).  One particularly important estimator of 
the average treatment effect is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is the 
effect of treatment for those individuals who actually receive treatment.36 
        ATT   =  E[Δ | X, D = 1]   
=  E[Y1 – Y0 | X, D = 1]   
=  E[Y1 | X, D = 1] – E[Y0 | X, D = 1]  
=  E[Y1 | X, D = 1] – E[Y0 | X, D = 0].              (A2) 
The ATT estimator compares the average outcome for those individuals who received treatment 
(Y1) to the average outcome for those individuals who did not receive treatment (which serve as 
an estimate of the counterfactual outcome, Y0).   
     In a matched-pair research design, each observation that received the treatment is paired with 
an observation that is similar along all other relevant observable dimensions (i.e., X) but that did 
not receive the treatment.  Since each matched pair is similar in every observable respect except 
that one observation received the treatment while the other did not, any difference in the outcome 
can, in the absence of hidden bias, be attributed to the difference in treatment.  The average 
effect of the treatment is calculated by combining equations (A1a) and (A1b) with equation (A2) 
as follows. 37  
                                                 
36 The identifying assumption required to estimate ATT (and, implicitly, used by the matching method to estimate 
the ATT) derived by Heckman, et al. (1997) is E[Y0 | X, D = 1]  =  E[Y0 | X, D = 0] = E[Y0 | X].  This requires that the 
expected outcome of those not receiving treatment conditional on the observable covariates X is the same regardless 
of whether treatment was received.   
37 The second step is based on the assumption that E[ε1 | X, D = 1]  =  E[ε0 | X, D = 0]  =  E[ε | X] or that the error is 
mean independent of the treatment. This assumption is referred to as “selection on observables” (Heckman and 
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 E[Y1 – Y0 | X, D]   = E[μ1(X) – μ0(X) + ε1 – ε0 | X, D] 
= E[μ1(X) + ε1 | X, D = 1] – E[μ0(X) + ε0 | X, D = 0]  
= E[μ1(X) | X, D = 1] – E[μ0(X) | X, D = 0]  
= E[μ1(X) | X, D = 1] – E[μ0(X) | X, D = 1] 
= E[μ1(X) – μ0(X) | X].       (A3) 
It is important to note that even if the functional forms of μ1 and μ0 are different, matching on X 
will still produce an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect.   
An alternative way to develop an estimator of the average treatment effect is to recast 
equations (A1a) and (A1b) in a “switching regression” framework (e.g., Roy (1951), Goldfeld 
and Quandt (1973), and Rubin (1978)) to yield the following linear model: 
           Y  =  Y0 + (Y1 – Y0)D    
=  α0 + β0X + ε0 + (α1 + β1X + ε1 – (α0 + β0X + ε0))D.    (A4) 
If the treatment solely affects the level of the outcome so that there is a homogeneous treatment 
effect (i.e., β0 = β1 and ε0 = ε1), this equation simplifies to 
          Y  =  α0 + βX + (α1 – α0)D + ε,       (A5) 
and the estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator, D, provides an estimate of the treatment 
effect (i.e., α1 – α0).  This approach assumes a linear relationship between the outcome and 
controls.  It also assumes that the relationship between the outcome and every control variable is 
identical for the treatment and control samples.  The implications of violating these assumptions 
are developed in Appendix B. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Robb, 1985) because it implies that there are no unobserved factors that affect selection into the treatment and 
control groups.  As we discuss further below, one way to assess the importance of this assumption is to establish 
boundaries on the significance level of the results, to assess the degree to which selection on unobservable variables 
would be required to alter the conclusions of the study (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
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Appendix B 
Comparison of Matching and Regression Approaches 
     To compare the efficacy of propensity-score matching relative to regression methods 
(including partial matching with regression), we rely on Figure B1, which depicts three cases of 
the true underlying relationship between Y (the outcome) and X (the observed covariate or 
control variable).  We assume that the probability density functions for Y given X are distributed 
normally with different means and possibly different variances.  In the first case (Panel A), both 
the treatment and control observations exhibit an identical linear relationship between X and Y.   
In the second case (Panel B), both the treatment and control observations exhibit a non-identical 
linear relationship between X and Y.  In particular, the degree to which treatment affects the 
outcome is linear in both the treatment and control samples, but the slopes differ across this 
partition.  In the third (and perhaps most realistic) case (Panel C), both the treatment and control 
observations exhibit a non-identical, non-linear relationship between X and Y.  In this setting, the 
degree to which treatment affects the outcome may be non-linear for both the treatment and 
control groups, and the functional form of the relationship differs across this partition. 
Perhaps because of perceived difficulty in identifying an appropriate match across multiple 
dimensions, researchers often use a partial match with regression-controls research design.  In 
this design, researchers match observations along only a few dimensions (e.g., year, industry, 
and size) and then “control” for other dimensions by including additional variables in a 
regression analysis (e.g., structure of the board of directors).  Inferences from this research 
design (or from a regression without matching), however, rely on potentially unrealistic, 
stringent assumptions about the underlying relationship between the outcome variable and the 
“control” variables.  If these assumptions are not satisfied, inferences are likely to be 
confounded.  Consider, for example, a setting in which two firms are matched on size and 
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industry membership and for which there is an additional covariate (e.g., board size) that is 
expected to be related to the outcome of interest.  If the researcher pools observations, includes a 
treatment indicator, D, and estimates a linear regression of this relationship, the estimation model 
resembles: 
Yi = α + γDi + βXi + ε,        (B1) 
where X is a covariate that is not included in the matching procedure but is instead included as a 
“control.”38   For this estimation, it can be shown that the coefficient for X at the point X = 
E(XOS) reflects a weighted average of the slope coefficients that would be estimated within the 
treatment and control groups separately.39   
In the case of an identical linear treatment effect illustrated in Panel A of Figure B1, the 
estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator will provide an unbiased estimate of the average 
treatment effect (i.e., E[Y1 | D = 1, X] – E[Y0 | D = 0, X]).  This occurs because the slope 
coefficients are identical for both the treatment and control groups and can be seen from the 
expression for γ, which is the estimate of the treatment effect in equation (B1).  The covariate in 
the regression essentially adjusts the estimated treatment and control means to the mean value of 
the covariate in the overlapping support, XOS (although any value in the overlapping support will 
provide identical estimates in this case).   
In the case of a non-identical linear treatment effect, illustrated in Panel B of Figure B1, the 
coefficient estimate of the treatment indicator from equation (B1) will yield a biased estimate of 
the treatment effect, γ.  This biased estimate occurs because the estimated slope coefficient in 
                                                 
38 For this example, we assume a linear functional form for expositional purposes only.  The issues we discuss in 
this section generalize to any specific functional form estimation of a pooled, partial-match regression setting with 
additional controls.   
39 Specifically, β = ρβ1 + (1 – ρ)β0, where ρ and (1 – ρ) is the fraction of the pooled sample that is from the treatment 
(control) group, respectively, and β0 and β1 represent the within-control and within-treatment sample slope 
coefficients, respectively.  The average treatment effect is evaluated at point E(XOS), since it is the expected value 
within the region of overlapping support for X.  
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equation (B1) is the weighted-average pooled estimate for both the treatment and control 
samples, and this pooled estimate is not equal to the actual slope for either of the samples, so the 
estimated counterfactual is incorrect.  In the particular case illustrated in Panel B, the estimated 
treatment effect from equation (B1) will underestimate the true, average treatment effect.  
Conversely, the estimate of the control on the outcome will be overstated because a portion of 
the treatment effect will be misattributed to the control.40  A solution to this problem (similar to 
the test of parallel lines in traditional analysis of covariance) is to alter equation (B1) to 
incorporate a separate intercept and slope for each sample and estimate:41 
Yi = α + γDi + βXi + δDi · Xi + εi.      (B2) 
If the researcher can correctly specify the functional form linking X and Y (e.g., linear over the 
entire range of X), the transformation from equation (B1) to equation (B2) will provide an 
unbiased estimate for the treatment effect.   
Finally, the case of a non-identical, non-linear treatment effect is illustrated in Panel C of 
Figure B1.  It can easily be seen that estimating a model similar to equation (B1) will almost 
never provide an unbiased estimate of the desired treatment effect.  In the unlikely case that the 
underlying nonlinear structural model is known, the functions depicted in Panel C can be 
estimated and the treatment effect can be evaluated at any point, but not by using linear 
regression.  Fortunately, the average treatment effect can be estimated with a matched pair 
research design, as shown in Appendix A. 
                                                 
40  The situation can also be reversed, depending on the relationship between the control covariate and the outcome 
in the treatment and control subsamples.  It can easily be the case that the true average treatment effect is overstated 
because part of the effect of the control on the outcome is misattributed to the treatment.  The key point is that the 
coefficient on the indicator variable in equation (A5) is not the correct estimate for the treatment effect. 
41 Although this is a simple estimation modification, none of the papers discussed in Table 1 examine whether the 
slopes on the covariates differ across the treatment and control groups. 
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The discussion above shows that the addition of “control” variables in a regression 
framework may not adequately control for the effect of confounding variables on the outcome of 
interest.  In particular, Panel A of Figure B1 illustrates the highly specialized case in which this 
approach will provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect.  However, this 
outcome requires a constant slope linking X to Y across groups. Panels B and C of Figure B1 
illustrate how, in the more general case, modeling the relationship as linear results in a biased 
estimate of the treatment effect.  In general, a matched research design (in which the match is 
performed along all relevant, observable dimensions) will provide a more robust estimate of the 
average treatment effect.  The only case in which the regression approach can dominate the 
propensity-score matched design occurs when the structural model linking the outcome variable 
to the covariates is known and can be fully specified.  However, knowledge of the underlying 
structural model is extremely unlikely, and misspecification of this structural model can result in 
additional sources of bias in the estimates of the treatment effect.  
.   
Figure B1:  Inferring Causal Effects Without Covariate Balance 
 
Panel A. 
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Figure B1:  Inferring Causal Effects Without Covariate Balance 
 
Panel B. 
 
Figure B1:  Inferring Causal Effects Without Covariate Balance 
 
Panel C. 
 
This figure depicts a nonlinear relationship between the dependent and independent variables (i.e., X and Y, respectively) for 
both the treatment and control samples.  The average treatment effect is appropriately evaluated at the average of the 
overlapping support.  Matching accomplishes this task by using only observations from the treatment and control samples in 
the region of overlapping support.  Linear regression with a treatment indicator estimates a linear projection over the entire 
support of both the treatment and control distributions and assumes an identical slope, but different intercepts for the two 
samples.  In this example, the average treatment effect estimated from linear regression will underestimate the average 
treatment effect. 
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Appendix C 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
EqIncQuint the quintile ranking of the CEO’s portfolio delta for which quintiles 
are computed annually from the cross-sectional distribution of 
portfolio deltas.  Portfolio delta is calculated as the change in the 
risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price 
Equilar 
Leverage the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed as (data9 + 
data34)/((data199 · data25) + data9) 
Compustat 
MarketCap the market value of equity computed as (data199 · data25) Compustat 
Idiosyncrisk the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific regression of 
monthly returns on the monthly return to the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio index using the previous 36 months (and requiring at least 
12 months) of observations (Core and Guay, 1999) 
CRSP 
MkttoBook the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
computed as ((data199 * data25)/data216) 
Compustat 
Tenure the CEO’s tenure with the firm in years Equilar 
OutsideChmn a dichotomous variable that equals one if the chairman of the Board 
of Directors is an outsider and zero otherwise 
Equilar 
OutsideLdDir a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm has appointed a 
lead independent director and zero otherwise 
Equilar 
CEOApptdOutsDirs the fraction of outside directors appointed by the CEO; calculated as 
the number of outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s 
tenure, scaled by the total number of directors 
Equilar 
StaggeredBd a dichotomous variable that equals one if the corporate directors 
have staggered terms and zero otherwise 
Equilar 
PctOldOutsDirs the number of outside directors who are at least 69 years old scaled 
by the total number of directors 
Equilar 
PctBusyOutsDirs the number of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least 
two boards scaled by the total number of directors 
Equilar 
PctFoundingDirs the number of directors who are founders of the firm scaled by the 
total number of directors 
Equilar 
OutsideDirHolds the number of shares held by outside directors scaled by the total 
number of shares outstanding 
Equilar 
NumberDirs the number of directors on the board Equilar 
PctFinExpsAud the number of directors with financial expertise who serve on the 
audit committee scaled by the total number of directors. Financial 
experts are directors who have experience as CEO, CFO, financial 
accountant, or auditor, or who have been licensed as a Certified 
Public or Chartered Accountant.  This variable is manually coded 
Equilar 
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from detailed biographical data 
DirCompMix the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash 
compensation for non-executive directors 
Equilar 
NumberInstOwns the number of institutional owners of the firm’s shares CDA/Spectrum 
NumBlockhldrs the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares 
CDA/Spectrum 
Activists the number of institutional owners denoted as activists. Activist 
shareholders are identified as CDA/Spectrum manager numbers 
12000, 12100, 12120, 18740, 38330, 81590, 49050, 54360, 57500, 
58650, 63600, 63850, 63895, 66550, 66610, 66635, 82895, 83360, 
90803, and 93405 (Cremers and Nair, 2005; Larcker, Richardson, 
and Tuna, 2007). 
CDA/Spectrum 
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Figure 1 
Accounting Irregularities: Frequency Distributions 
Frequency of observed Accounting Irregularities for each equity-incentive quintile  
(Contemporaneous n = 13,706; One Year Ahead n = 10,773) 
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Accounting Irregularity frequency is presented for each quintile of CEO equity incentives.  CEO equity incentives is 
measured as the portfolio delta (PortDelta), which is the change in the risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity 
portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 1999).  To compute PortDelta, the value of 
stock and restricted stock is assumed to change dollar-for-dollar with changes in the price of the underlying stock.  
The value of stock options is assumed to change according to the option’s delta, which is the derivative of its Black-
Scholes value with respect to the price of the underlying stock (See Core and Guay, 2002).  Black-Scholes 
parameters are computed using methods similar to Core and Guay (2002).  Specifically, annualized volatility is 
calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months 
of returns).  The risk-free rate is calculated using an interpolated interest rate on a Treasury note with the same 
maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for the prevalence of 
early-exercise.  Dividend Yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of the month.  Contemporaneous Irregularities are those that occur in the same fiscal year of CEO 
equity incentives measurement.  One Year Ahead Irregularities are those that occur in the fiscal year that follows 
CEO equity-incentive measurement. 
Table 1 
Summary of Prior Literature 
Study Primary Equity 
Incentives Proxy 
Accounting 
Irregularities Proxy 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Research Design Sample Observed 
Association  
Baber, Kang, 
Liang (2007) 
Compensation Mix, 
Exercisable Options 
scaled by Shares 
Outstanding 
Restatements CEO Matched pair (year, 
industry, exchange, assets) 
logistic regression 
193 firm-years 
plus matches, 
1997-2002 
None 
Harris and 
Bromiley (2007) 
Option and Bonus 
Value scaled by 
Total Compensation 
Value 
Restatements CEO Matched pair (year, 
industry, sales) conditional 
logistic regression 
434 firm-years 
plus matches, 
1997-2002 
Positive for Option 
Value scaled by 
Total Compensation 
Value 
Larcker, 
Richardson, Tuna 
(2007) 
Compensation Mix Abnormal Accruals, 
Restatements 
CEO OLS regression, Pooled 
logistic regression 
1,484 firm-years, 
118 firm-years 
plus all other 
firm-year 
observations, 
2002-2003  
Positive, None 
Efendi, 
Srivastava, 
Swanson (2007) 
Component Value, 
Option Intrinsic 
Value, Option Delta 
Restatements, Severe 
Restatements 
CEO Matched pair (year, 
industry, assets) logistic 
regression, ordered logistic 
regression 
95 firm-years plus 
matches, 2001-
2002 
Positive for option 
intrinsic value and 
option delta 
Erickson, 
Hanlon, Maydew 
(2006) 
Portfolio Delta AAERs Top 5 execs Matched firms (year, 
industry, assets) logistic 
regression 
50 firm-years plus 
matches, 1996-
2003 
None 
Johnson, Ryan, 
Tian (2009) 
Portfolio Delta and 
Component Deltas 
AAERs Top 5 execs 
and CEO 
only 
Matched pair (year, 
industry, revenues) 
conditional logistic 
regression 
53 firm-years plus 
matches, 1992-
2001 
Positive only for 
incentives related to 
unrestricted stock  
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Table 1 (continued) 
Summary of Prior Literature  
Study Primary Equity 
Incentives Proxy 
Accounting 
Irregularities Proxy 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Research Design Sample Observed 
Association  
Burns, Kedia 
(2006) 
Portfolio Delta and 
Component Deltas 
Restatements, 
Restatement 
Magnitude 
CEO Pooled logistic regression, 
Pooled OLS regression 
266 firm-years 
plus all other 
ExecuComp 
firm-years, 
1995-2002 
Positive only for 
incentives related 
to stock options 
Bergstresser, 
Philippon (2006) 
Incentive Ratio 
(Portfolio Delta 
scaled by 
compensation) 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
CEO OLS regression 4,761 firm-
years, 1994-
2000 
Positive 
O’Connor, Priem, 
Coombs, Gilley 
(2006) 
Black Scholes 
Option Value 
Restatements CEO Matched pair (year, 
industry, sales, income, 
option vesting schedules) 
65 firm-years 
plus matches, 
2000-2004 
Positive if (1) CEO 
is board chair and 
other board 
members do not 
receive options, or 
(2) CEO is not 
board chair and 
other board 
members receive 
options 
Cheng, Warfield 
(2005) 
Component 
Holdings scaled by 
shares outstanding 
Meet / Just Beat 
Expectations, 
Abnormal Accruals 
CEO Pooled Logistic regression, 
Pooled OLS 
4,301 firm-
years, 6,307 
firm-years, 
1993-2000 
Positive only for 
unexercisable 
options and stock 
holdings 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Accounting Irregularities, CEO Equity  
Incentives, and Firm Characteristics  
 
Panel A. Accounting Irregularities (n = 13,706) 
Variable Period Number of Firms Percentage 
Manipulation Restatement Pooled 464 3.4% 
 2001 17 0.1% 
 2002 69 0.5% 
 2003 96 0.7% 
 2004 203 1.5% 
 2005 79 0.6% 
Accounting Lawsuit Pooled 464 3.4% 
 2001 122 0.9% 
 2002 98 0.7% 
 2003 118 0.9% 
 2004 83 0.6% 
 2005 43 0.3% 
AAER  Pooled 157 1.2% 
 2001 50 0.4% 
 2002 48 0.4% 
 2003 35 0.3% 
 2004 18 0.1% 
 2005 6 0.0% 
 
Restatement data are obtained from Glass-Lewis & Co., which comprehensively collects restatement information 
from SEC filings, press releases, and other public data.  We identify accounting restatements between 2001 and 
2005 that relate to perceived reporting manipulation classified as accounting fraud, an SEC investigation, a 
securities class action suit, improper reserve allowances, improper revenue recognition, or improper expense 
recognition.  We code a restatement incident as the first fiscal year in which improper accounting occurred that 
subsequently required restatement.    
 
Accounting lawsuits are obtained from a database provided by Woodruff-Sawyer and Co. that records class 
action lawsuit periods between 2001 and 2005. These lawsuits allege earnings estimate improprieties, financial 
misrepresentation, failure to adhere to GAAP, or restatement of earnings.  We code a lawsuit incident as the 
first fiscal year in which the firm is named in a lawsuit damage period.   
 
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) are identified from the comprehensive AAER 
listing provided on the SEC website for allegation periods between 2001 and 2005. These allegations cite 
earnings-estimate improprieties, financial misrepresentation, or failure to adhere to GAAP. We code an AAER 
incident as the first fiscal year in which the SEC alleges accounting manipulation occurred, as detailed in the 
Enforcement Release. 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B. CEO Equity Incentives (n =10,773) 
Variable Period EqIncQuint = 1  EqIncQuint = 2  EqIncQuint = 3  EqIncQuint = 4  EqIncQuint = 5 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
PortDelta Pooled 24,980 24,357  88,124 84,941  210,928 204,436  519,365 489,012  4,819,973 1,822,611 
 2001 25,999 27,159  91,085 87,636  224,167 222,667  537,664 501,469  5,117,285 2,114,765 
 2002 17,086 16,875  62,607 60,660  153,596 149,491  400,245 379,358  4,274,464 1,412,645 
 2003 25,841 25,213  94,731 91,931  227,433 224,623  549,970 518,465  4,829,008 1,863,581 
 2004 28,628 27,830  99,706 97,226  230,843 223,186  572,769 548,654  4,994,529 1,963,088 
 2005 26,072 26,110  91,802 89,460  218,183 216,843  536,657 498,068  4,930,282 1,879,171 
CEO equity incentives are measured as the portfolio delta (PortDelta), which is the change in the risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio 
for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 1999).  To compute PortDelta, the value of stock and restricted stock is assumed to change 
dollar-for-dollar with changes in the price of the underlying stock.  The value of stock options is assumed to change according to the option’s delta, 
which is the derivative of its Black-Scholes value with respect to the price of the underlying stock (See Core and Guay, 2002).  Black-Scholes 
parameters are computed using methods similar to Core and Guay (2002).  Specifically, annualized volatility is calculated using continuously 
compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months of returns).  The risk-free rate is calculated using an interpolated 
interest rate on a Treasury note with the same maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for the 
prevalence of early exercise.  Dividend Yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
month.  
Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C. Firm Characteristics (n =10,773) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Leverage 0.204 0.144 0.231 
MarketCap 3,775 551 16,791 
Idiosyncrisk 0.152 0.130 0.088 
MkttoBook 2.865 2.120 2.853 
Tenure 6.862 4.800 7.235 
OutsideChmn 0.132 0.000 0.339 
OutsideLdDir 0.194 0.000 0.395 
CEOApptdOutsDirs 0.700 0.800 0.329 
StaggeredBd 0.580 1.000 0.494 
PctOldOutsDirs 0.143 0.125 0.142 
PctBusyOutsDirs 0.250 0.222 0.209 
PctFoundingDirs 0.034 0.000 0.075 
OutsideDirHolds 0.013 0.003 0.033 
NumberDirs 8.600 8.000 2.633 
PctFinExpsAud 0.674 0.667 0.244 
DirCompMix 0.495 0.531 0.319 
NumInstOwns 133 89 151 
NumBlockhldrs 1.886 2.000 1.530 
Activists 0.013 0.000 0.115 
 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * 
data25) + data9).  MarketCap is the market value of equity computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25).  
Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific regression of monthly returns on the monthly 
return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core and Guay, 1999).  At least 12 and no more than 36 monthly 
return observations are required for estimation.  MkttoBook is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216).  Tenure is the CEO’s tenure with the firm in years, 
as provided by Equilar.  OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board chairman is delineated as 
an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise.  OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the lead 
independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. CEOApptdOutsDirs is the number of 
outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors.  StaggeredBd is a 
dichotomous variable that equals one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise.  
PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who are at least 69 years old to total directors.  PctBusyOutsDirs is the 
ratio of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors.  PctFoundingDirs is the 
ratio of directors who are founding firm members to total directors.  OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by 
outside directors to total shares outstanding.  NumberDirs is the number of directors on the board.  PctFinExpsAud is 
the ratio of directors with financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors. Directors are 
classified as financial experts if they have experience as CEO, CFO, financial accountant, or auditor, or if they have 
been licensed as a Certified Public or Chartered Accountant.  DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity 
compensation to total equity plus cash compensation for non-executive directors.  NumberInstOwns is the number of 
institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum database.  NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners 
that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists is the number of institutional owners denoted as activists by 
Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007). 
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Table 3 
Propensity-Score Estimation Using Conditional Ordered Logistic Regression 
Dependent Variable = 
EqIncQuint Pred. Avg. Coeff. 
Aggr. z-
Statistic 
Yrs. With 
Pos. Coeff. 
Yrs. With 
Neg. Coeff. 
Leverage − −0.398 −3.938 0 4 
Log(MarketCap) + 1.524 41.320 4 0 
Log(Idiosyncrisk) + 0.111 2.438 4 0 
MkttoBook + 0.033 4.083 4 0 
Log(1 + Tenure) + 0.734 32.190 4 0 
OutsideChmn ? −0.699 −11.565 0 4 
OutsideLdDir ? −0.302 −3.861 0 4 
CEOApptdOutsDirs ? 1.027 15.844 4 0 
StaggeredBd ? −0.031 −0.824 2 2 
PctOldOutsDirs ? 0.085 0.674 2 2 
PctBusyOutsDirs ? −0.002 0.162 2 2 
PctFoundingDirs ? 3.015 10.837 4 0 
OutsideDirHolds ? 3.912 6.384 4 0 
Log(1+NumberDirs) ? −1.272 −13.427 0 4 
PctFinExpsAud ? −0.006 −0.136 2 2 
DirCompMix ? 0.298 4.522 4 0 
Log(1+NumInstOwns) ? −0.344 −6.737 0 4 
Log(1+NumBlockhldrs) ? 0.195 5.432 4 0 
Log(1+Activists) ? −0.673 −2.903 0 4 
Intercept EqIncQuint 1? 2 + 4.524 21.288 4 0 
Intercept EqIncQuint 2? 3 + 6.334 29.194 4 0 
Intercept EqIncQuint 3? 4 + 7.882 35.516 4 0 
Intercept EqIncQuint 4? 5 + 9.672 42.373 4 0 
CEO-firm-year obs.  10,773    
Adj. Pseudo-R2  0.273    
EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta falls within the kth quintile of the cross-
sectional distribution of CEO deltas and equals zero otherwise.  The portfolio delta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s 
equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * data25) + data9).  MarketCap is the market value of equity 
computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25).  Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific 
regression of monthly returns on the monthly return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core and Guay, 1999).  At 
least 12 and no more than 36 monthly return observations are required for estimation.  MkttoBook is the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216).  Tenure is the CEO’s 
tenure with the firm in years, as provided by Equilar.  OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board 
chairman is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise.  OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals 
one if the lead independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. CEOApptdOutsDirs is the 
number of outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors.  StaggeredBd 
is a dichotomous variable that equals one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise.  
PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who are at least 69 years old to total directors.  PctBusyOutsDirs is the ratio of 
outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors.  PctFoundingDirs is the ratio of directors 
who are founding firm members to total directors.  OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by outside directors to total 
shares outstanding.  NumberDirs is the number of directors on the board.  PctFinExpsAud is the ratio of directors with 
financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors. Directors are classified as financial experts if they 
have experience as CEO, CFO, financial accountant, or auditor, or if they have been licensed as a Certified Public or 
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Chartered Accountant.  DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash compensation for 
non-executive directors.  NumberInstOwns is the number of institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum database.  
NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists is the number of 
institutional owners denoted as activists by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).  
The first column reports the average coefficient estimate across year-specific estimation from 2001 through 2005.  The 
second column reports an aggregate z-statistic, which is calculated as the sum of the individual annual z-statistics divided 
by the square root of the number of years over which equation (2) is estimated.  This aggregated z-statistic assumes that 
each annual estimation is independent of the other estimations.  The final two columns report the number of years for 
which the year-specific coefficient is positive and negative, respectively.  Adj. Pseudo R2 is the average McFadden’s 
adjusted pseudo R2. 
Table 4 
Matched-Pair Frequencies for Equity-Incentive Quintiles 
Frequencies of the dosage differences between the matched pairs 
Treatment Equity Incentive Quintile Control 
Equity 
Incentive 
Quintile 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 0 670 188 25 71 954 
2  0 821 442 130 1,393 
3   0 786 404 1,190 
4    0 1,022 1,022 
5     0 0 
Total 0 670 1,009 1,253 1,627 4,559 
 
 
Matched pairs are formed using the following distance metric: 
   
Δi,j = 
2
2
)(
)(
ji
ji PScorePScore
δδ −
−   if δi ≠ δj 
Δi,j =   ∞   if δi = δj,     
 
PScore is the propensity score computed from equation (1), δ is each observation’s equity incentive 
treatment quintile, and i, j denote individual observations.   
 
Matched pairs are identified through a nonbipartite algorithm to identify, across all possible 
permutations, the minimum sum of pairwise distances, ∑Δ ji, for i ≠ j, where each observation is paired 
with another and observations can be used only once for matching. 
 
Higher equity-incentive observations are labeled as treatment, and lower equity-incentive observations 
are labeled as control.   
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Table 5 
Covariate Balance Between the Matched Pairs 
Test statistics of covariate distributions for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity 
incentives) groups (n = 4,559 matched pairs) 
 
 Mean Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Median 
Treatment 
Median 
Control  
t-Test 
Difference 
p-Value 
KS Bootstrap 
Difference 
p-Value 
Leverage 0.205 0.200 0.149 0.152  0.281 0.407 
Log(MarketCap) 6.322 6.297 6.234 6.210  0.417 0.179 
Log(Idiosyncrisk) -2.045 -2.018 -2.059 -2.024  0.017 0.000 
MkttoBook 2.785 2.770 2.113 2.028  0.794 0.002 
Log(1 + Tenure) 1.640 1.625 1.740 1.705  0.445 0.000 
OutsideChmn 0.122 0.121 0.000 0.000  0.898 0.910 
OutsideLdDir 0.157 0.160 0.000 0.000  0.667 0.687 
CEOApptdOutsDirs 0.703 0.707 0.800 0.800  0.556 0.313 
StaggeredBd 0.597 0.594 1.000 1.000  0.749 0.747 
PctOldOutsDirs 0.152 0.152 0.125 0.133  0.945 0.252 
PctBusyOutsDirs 0.239 0.242 0.200 0.200  0.450 0.153 
PctFoundingDirs 0.036 0.035 0.000 0.000  0.436 0.000 
OutsideDirHolds 0.014 0.014 0.003 0.003  0.854 0.001 
Log(NumberDirs) 2.222 2.222 2.197 2.197  0.927 0.758 
PctFinExpsAud 0.745 0.750 1.000 1.000  0.531 0.540 
DirCompMix 0.495 0.507 0.549 0.537  0.075 0.000 
Log(NumInstOwns) 4.359 4.368 4.466 4.466  0.640 0.822 
Log(NumBlockhldrs) 0.895 0.917 1.099 1.099  0.067 0.009 
Log(Activists) 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.000  0.647 0.697 
 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * data25) + data9).  
MarketCap is the market value of equity computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25).  Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of 
residuals from a firm-specific regression of monthly returns on the monthly return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core 
and Guay, 1999).  At least 12 and no more than 36 monthly return observations are required for estimation.  MkttoBook is the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216).  Tenure is the CEO’s 
tenure with the firm in years, as provided by Equilar.  OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board chairman is 
delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise.  OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the lead 
independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. CEOApptdOutsDirs is the number of outside directors 
whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors.  StaggeredBd is a dichotomous variable that equals 
one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise.  PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors 
who are at least 69 years old to total directors.  PctBusyOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least 
two boards to total directors.  PctFoundingDirs is the ratio of directors who are founding firm members to total directors.  
OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by outside directors to total shares outstanding.  NumberDirs is the number of directors on 
the board.  PctFinExpsAud is the ratio of directors with financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors. Directors 
are classified as financial experts if they have experience as CEO, CFO, financial accountant, or auditor, or if they have been licensed as 
a Certified Public or Chartered Accountant.  DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash 
compensation for non-executive directors.  NumberInstOwns is the number of institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum 
database.  NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists is the number of 
institutional owners denoted as activists by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).
Table 6 
Accounting Irregularities 
Frequency of observed accounting irregularities for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity incentives) groups 
 
Panel A.   Accounting Manipulation-Related Restatements 
EqIncQuintt  Restatement Frequencyt  Restatement Frequencyt+1 
T C  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC 
5 4  38 40 0.910  1,582,081 501,198  31 55 0.013 1.37 1,529,602 528,784 
5 3  8 11 0.646     15 16 1.000    
5 2  4 4 0.724     2 4 0.683    
5 1  0 3 0.248     2 1 1.000    
4 3  29 38 0.328  472,528 222,198  29 33 0.703  450,777 223,529 
4 2  16 17 1.000     11 11 0.831    
4 1  0 0 1.000     1 0 1.000    
3 2  36 32 0.716  204,615 96,106  35 44 0.368  185,660 91,726 
3 1  7 8 1.000     9 4 0.267    
2 1  23 21 0.880  83,670 29,833  24 21 0.766  78,978 25,552 
Pooled  Pooled   161 174 0.512  429,801 147,548  159 189 0.120  713,271 178,435 
 
DiffEqIncQuintt  Restatement Frequencyt  Restatement Frequencyt+1 
T - C  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC 
4  0 3 0.248     2 1 1.000    
3  4 4 0.724     3 4 1.000    
2  31 36 0.625     35 31 0.712    
1  126 131 0.803  368,860 167,047  119 153 0.045 1.04 371,114 162,026 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Accounting Irregularities 
Frequency of observed accounting irregularities for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity incentives) groups 
 
Panel B.  Accounting-Related Shareholder Lawsuits 
EqIncQuintt  Lawsuit Frequencyt  Lawsuit Frequencyt+1 
T C  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC  T C P Γ $IncentT $IncentC 
5 4  42 65 0.033 1.13 1,596,888 527,222  31 41 0.289  1,474,446 524,969 
5 3  6 16 0.055 1.49    7 22 0.009 3.15   
5 2  4 8 0.386     5 5 0.752    
5 1  4 5 1.000     4 1 0.371    
4 3  31 36 0.625  451,960 226,679  22 17 0.522  401,866 183,203 
4 2  17 17 0.864     11 13 0.838    
4 1  1 0 1.000     0 0 1.000    
3 2  31 24 0.418  184,689 74,294  12 26 0.035 1.41 170,823 75,432 
3 1  0 2 0.480     1 1 0.480    
2 1  7 14 0.190  77,684 24,576  5 7 0.773  65,287 24,233 
Pooled  Pooled   143 187 0.018 1.06 630,373 189,108  98 133 0.025 1.07 713,271 178,435 
 
DiffEqIncQuintt  Lawsuit Frequencyt  Lawsuit Frequencyt+1 
T - C  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC  T C P Γ $IncentT $IncentC 
4  4 5 1.000     4 1 0.371    
3  5 8 0.579     5 5 0.752    
2  23 35 0.149     19 36 0.031 1.30   
1  111 139 0.088 1.01 568,488 276,337  70 91 0.115  581,103 265,093 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Accounting Irregularities 
Frequency of observed Accounting Irregularities for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity incentives) groups 
Panel C.  Accounting-Related SEC Enforcement Actions (AAERs) 
EqIncQuintt  AAER Frequencyt  AAER Frequencyt+1 
T C  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC  T C P Γ $IncentT $IncentC 
5 4  9 29 0.002 6.26 1,636,782 477,647  7 19 0.031 1.80 1,523,063 514,917 
5 3  2 5 0.450     3 0 0.248    
5 2  0 2 0.480     0 1 1.000    
5 1  2 1 1.000     2 0 0.480    
4 3  10 10 0.823  439,622 243,417  9 5 0.423  381,774 238,192 
4 2  4 11 0.121     3 6 0.505    
4 1  0 0 0.000     1 0 1.000    
3 2  10 11 1.000  183,834 81,296  6 12 0.239  177,221 72,115 
3 1  1 1 0.480     1 0 1.000    
2 1  6 3 0.505  72,381 23,258  4 3 1.000  60,539 19,342 
Pooled  Pooled   44 73 0.010 1.32 557,843 153,427  36 46 0.320  406,358 120,498 
 
DiffEqIncQuintt  AAER Frequencyt  AAER Frequencyt+1 
T - C  T C p Γ $IncentT $IncentC  T C P Γ $IncentT $IncentC 
4  2 1 1.000     2 0 0.480    
3  0 2 0.480     1 1 0.480    
2  7 17 0.066 1.29    7 6 1.000    
1  35 53 0.070 1.05 504,338 249,946  26 39 0.137  372,203 212,802 
 
EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta falls within the kth quintile of the cross-sectional distribution of CEO deltas and 
equals zero otherwise.  The portfolio delta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price.  
DiffEqIncQuint is the difference between EqIncQuint for the Treatment and Control groups.  Each cell contains the discordant pair frequency of observing an 
accounting irregularity.  In other words, the frequency count in the Treatment category denotes the number of observations for which there is an observed accounting 
irregularity in the treatment group but no observed accounting irregularity in the control group.  p-values are computed using a McNemar’s non-parametric test for 
differences in frequency across distributions.  Γ values quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to alter the statistical significance (p = 0.10) that results from the 
assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of receiving treatment.  $Incent is the median portfolio delta computed for 
the Treatment and Control matched observations reported in the frequency cells.  $Incent is reported only when DiffEqIncQuint = 1 (and for Pooled data), since this  
reflects the minimum equity-incentive distance and there is sufficient sample size for tests of median differences.  All $IncentT - $IncentC differences are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (two-tailed) using a Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Table 7 
Sensitivity Analysis: Conditional Logistic Regression 
Panel A.  Regression Estimates 
 Restatementt  Lawsuitt  AAERt 
 Coeff. z-Stat  Coeff. z-Stat  Coeff. z-Stat 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 0.037 0.10  −0.219 −0.60  −0.794 −0.72 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 −0.014 −0.06  −0.193 −0.67  −0.412 −0.36 
EqIncQuint4 = 1 −0.288 −0.66  −0.012 −0.03  −0.174 −0.17 
EqIncQuint5 = 1 −0.406 −0.94  −0.613 −1.35  −1.382 −1.09 
Matched CEO-firm-year obs.  770   798   262 
Adj. Pseudo-R2  0.144   0.198   0.429 
         
Tests of Coefficients  p-Value   p-Value   p-Value 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint3 = 1  0.89   0.90   0.38 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1  0.38   0.51   0.32 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.20   0.23   0.52 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1  0.47   0.40   0.75 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.24   0.12   0.31 
EqIncQuint4 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.74   0.02   0.13 
 
 Restatementt+1  Lawsuitt+1  AAERt+1 
 Coeff. z-Stat  Coeff. z-Stat  Coeff. z-Stat 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 −0.372 −1.41  −0.076 −0.17  1.666 1.19 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 −0.073 −0.24  −0.163 −0.33  −0.691 −0.39 
EqIncQuint4 = 1 −0.108 −0.33  −0.115 −0.20  2.258 1.13 
EqIncQuint5 = 1 −0.767 −1.79  −0.263 −0.58  0.437 0.24 
Matched CEO- firm-year obs.  668   514   176 
Adj. Pseudo-R2  0.095   0.184   0.506 
         
Tests of Coefficients  p-Value   p-Value   p-Value 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint3 = 1  0.89   0.81   0.01 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1  0.38   0.93   0.60 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.20   0.69   0.40 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1  0.47   0.90   0.00 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.24   0.76   0.19 
EqIncQuint4 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.74   0.71   0.12 
 
 Table 7 
Sensitivity Analysis: Conditional Logistic Regression (continued) 
Panel B.  Covariate Balance Between Irregularity and Matched Observations 
 
 
Table 5 
Median 
Trt.-Cntrl. 
Restatementt 
Median 
Irreg.-Match 
Restatementt+1 
Median  
Irreg.-Match 
Lawsuitt 
Median  
Irreg.-Match 
Lawsuitt+1 
Median  
Irreg.-Match 
AAERt 
Median  
Irreg.-Match 
AAERt+1 
Median  
Irreg.-Match 
PortDelta 1.193*** −0.291*** −0.117*** −0.209*** 0.029*** −0.248*** 0.050*** 
Leverage 0.000*** 0.034*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.000*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 
Log(MarketCap) 0.041*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Log(Idiosyncrisk) −0.036*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.134*** 0.127*** 
MkttoBook 0.057*** −0.312*** −0.277*** −0.105*** −0.026*** −0.320*** −0.082*** 
Log(1 + Tenure) 0.000*** −0.261*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.169*** −0.000*** 0.084*** 
OutsideChmn 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
OutsideLdDir 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CEOApptdOutsDirs 0.000*** −0.066*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
StaggeredBd 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PctOldOutsDirs 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000*** 
PctBusyOutsDirs 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.015*** 0.000*** 0.000*** −0.033*** −0.054*** 
PctFoundingDirs 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
OutsideDirHolds 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Log(NumberDirs) 0.000*** 0.068*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PctFinExpsAud 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
DirCompMix 0.000*** −0.004*** 0.000*** 0.035*** 0.077*** −0.050*** −0.025*** 
Log(NumInstOwns) 0.000*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.141*** 0.115*** 
Log(NumBlockhldrs) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Log(Activists) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of pairs 4,559 385 334 399 257 131 88 
 
EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta (PortDelta) falls within the kth quintile of the cross-sectional distribution of CEO 
deltas and equals zero otherwise.  PortDelta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price.  Leverage is 
the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * data25) + data9).  MarketCap is the market value of equity 
computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25).  Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific regression of monthly returns on the monthly 
return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core and Guay, 1999).  At least 12 and no more than 36 monthly return observations are required for estimation.  
MkttoBook is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216).  Tenure is the CEO’s tenure 
with the firm in years, as provided by Equilar.  OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board chairman is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and 
is zero otherwise.  OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the lead independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. 
CEOApptdOutsDirs is the number of outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors.  StaggeredBd is a dichotomous 
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variable that equals one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise.  PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who are at least 
69 years old to total directors.  PctBusyOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors.  PctFoundingDirs is 
the ratio of directors who are founding firm members to total directors.  OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by outside directors to total shares outstanding.  
NumberDirs is the number of directors on the board.  PctFinExpsAud is the ratio of directors with financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors.  
DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash compensation for non-executive directors.  NumberInstOwns is the number of 
institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum database.  NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists 
is the number of institutional owners denoted as activists by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007). *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, from a KS bootstrap test of median differences.  
Table 8 
Sensitivity Analysis: Early Sample 
Panel A.  Regression estimates 
 
 AAERt  AAERt 
 Coeff. z-Stat  Coeff. z-Stat 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 −0.155 −0.21  −0.040 −0.04 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 0.642 0.87  1.066 1.00 
EqIncQuint4 = 1 0.099 0.13  1.158 0.97 
EqIncQuint5 = 1 1.063 1.36  3.414 2.30 
CEO- firm-year obs.  150   150 
Adj. Pseudo-R2  0.191   0.412 
Estimation Method  Logistic   Cond. Logistic 
      
Tests of Coefficients  p-Value   p-Value 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint3 = 1  0.25   0.25 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1  0.72   0.23 
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.09   0.01 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1  0.39   0.91 
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.50   0.02 
EqIncQuint4 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1  0.12   0.02 
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Table 8 
Sensitivity Analysis: Early Sample (continued) 
Panel B.  AAER frequency for treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and control 
(low CEO equity incentives) groups, matched by propensity score 
 
EqIncQuint  AAER Frequency 
T C  T C p Γ 
5 4  16 5 0.029 1.68 
5 3  0 0 1.000  
5 2  0 0 1.000  
5 1  0 0 1.000  
4 3  3 6 0.505  
4 2  0 0 1.000  
4 1  0 0 1.000  
3 2  3 2 1.000  
3 1  0 0 1.000  
2 1  2 13 0.010 11.92 
Pooled  Pooled  24 26 0.888  
 
DiffEqIncQuint  AAER Frequency 
T - C  T C p Γ 
4  0 0 1.000  
3  0 0 1.000  
2  0 0 1.000  
1  24 26 0.888  
 
  
Regression statistics in Panel A derive from logistic or conditional logistic regression of AAER = β1  +∑
=
5
2k
kβ  
EqIncQuintk + β6 CEO=CHAIR + β7 NUMMTGS + β8 FINANCING + β9 LEVERAGE + β10 MARKET VALUE OF 
EQUITY + β11 ALTMAN’S Z + β12 BOOK TO MARKET + β13 EARNINGS TO PRICE + β14 RET ON ASSETS + β15 
SALES GROWTH + β16 AGE OF FIRM + β17 M&A IN FIRST YEAR OF FRAUD + β18  STOCK VOLATILITY + β19 
CEO TENURE + β20 MISSING CEO  TENURE + εi.  
EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta falls within the kth quintile of the 
cross-sectional distribution of CEO deltas and equals zero otherwise.  The portfolio delta is the change in dollar value 
of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price.  See Erickson, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2006) for other variable definitions. 
Cells in Panel B contain the discordant pair frequency of observing an accounting irregularity.  In other words, the 
frequency count in the Treatment category denotes the number of observations where there is an observed accounting 
irregularity in the treatment group but no observed accounting irregularity in the control group.  p-values are 
computed using a McNemar’s non-parametric test for differences in frequency across distributions.  DiffEqIncQuint 
is the difference between EqIncQuint for the Treatment and Control groups.  Propensity scores are estimated through 
logistic regression of EqIncQuint = β1  + β2 CEO=CHAIR + β3 NUMMTGS + β4 FINANCING + β5 LEVERAGE + β6 
MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY + β7 ALTMAN’S Z + β8 BOOK TO MARKET + β9 EARNINGS TO PRICE + β10 RET 
ON ASSETS + β11 SALES GROWTH + β12 AGE OF FIRM + β13 M&A IN FIRST YEAR OF FRAUD + β14  STOCK 
VOLATILITY + β15 CEO TENURE + β16 MISSING CEO  TENURE + εi. 
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Γ values quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to alter the statistical significance (p = 0.10) that results from the 
assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of receiving treatment.    
